



7. The problem of a movement leader 
A change in the context implies generational change and, conse-
quently, replacement of movement leaders. There are still a good many poli-
ticians on the national political arena whose leadership mentality practically 
has not altered over the past 25 years. Such mentality is inherent chiefly to 
the communist, liberal democratic and social democratic factions whose 
leaders have been already elected to the new State Duma. One more thing is 
of no less importance: the mentality of leaders of the so-called non-system 
opposition is altering [15], but slower than the changes taking place in soci-
ety required. Democracy is initially a process of learning, and it is an infinite 
process.  
To begin with, the tactics of the leaders of the old political opposi-
tion lagged behind the tactics of the leaders of new, civic opposition, that is, 
network tactics which were practiced by rank-and-file activists. Second, op-
position politicians wanted fair elections, chiefly in order to create equal 
competition positions for all political parties, while network-based organiza-
tions of civil society had been long practicing ‘non-political politics’ (U. 
Beck) resting upon horizontal links. The alternative agenda was worked out 
precisely here. That is why the former’s tactical lagging behind the latter was 
quite logical. The former, the ‘first-wave’ opposition politicians, fought for 
the construction of a fair parliamentary and presidential election mechanism, 
whereas the latter, relying on local protest groups, wanted to create a mecha-
nism of countrywide network pressure on government structures aimed at 
democratization of the whole political system. Third, for the first-wave op-
position politicians, part of whom had already been members of the parlia-
ments of previous convocations, engagement in politics was akin to playing 
a card game: having completed (lost) the first round, let’s start a second one.  
As to maturing ‘network opposition’, the continuity of action was 
crucially important. They had to build up an extra-parliamentary pressure 
continually because this was the only instrument of political struggle avail-
able to them to which the authorities did respond. At the same time, the 
‘network opposition’ opposition was to enlighten and to mobilize their local 
allies and sympathizers. A round table modelled by the Polish Solidarity of 
the 1980s, suggested by some of the first-wave oppositionists and to which 
government representatives consented, would have been a step back since 
the right to draw up an ‘agenda’ belonged to the power elite. Fourth, the em-




stage of such struggle. These are not mass protest meetings only but, more 
importantly, structured pressure on all echelons of power. Fifth, the question 
when ‘it is too early’ and when ‘it is too late’ stood prominently in the Rus-
sian political discourse from the early 20th century. This question keeps its 
relevancy today. But another, no less important question, is practically not 
discussed: what political colouring should network power assume? It will be 
democratic, conservative, national-patriotic or some other? In my view, if 
network power establishes itself in the foreseeable future, it will be anything 
but democratic. Because ‘democracy’ in the current Russian version means 
mass top-down organized support to the first candidate to presidency and the 
policy he is going to pursue. 
As to the leaders of the ‘new middle-class’, they want political free-
doms and fair competition, but lack the sense of responsibility and empathy 
to ‘others’ – they are individualists. Neither do they have an ideology of 
their own. This middle class has been formed in consumer society and there-
fore it is alien to Russian culture. There are leaders in fashions, pops, sports 
and glamour life in consumer society, but there are no real political leaders 
because of the absence of competitive environment where they might have 
been raised. The pre-election debates featured on TV looked more like TV 
shows than serious discussions on the political course and social pro-
grammes. The ‘new middle-class’ have not been briefed in democracy and 
do not know what types of democratic leaders come to the fore in the periods 
of political upsurge. Democracy had been proclaimed in Russian Federation 
for more than 25 years on end, but almost all declarations remained on pa-
per.  
On the other hand, the above young people paying short visits to for-
eign countries actually saw only the façade of Western democracy. There 
had been no democratic traditions in tsarist Russia for many centuries except 
for peasant communities perhaps. There may be a long way from the onset 
of de-sacralisation of rulers today to democracy as a fundamental principle 
of social system, an immense distance in fact. There are no new brilliant po-
litical leaders so far. In the opinion of Vladislav Inozemtsev, a leading Rus-
sian political analyst, today’s leader ‘must be not a politician who has 
dropped out of power earlier, but a young agitator who is striving to get 
there… Russia needs its own Vaclav Havel, an unblemished intellectual who 
has never collaborated with the government and has never been drawn in it’ 
(Inozemtsev, 2011: 3). But Russia has no such people – all Russian intellec-




my opinion, democracy as a way of life is closely connected with the quan-
tity and quality of labour of its bearers. The foundations of democracy can-
not be built under conditions of redistributive economy (Bessonova, 2006), 
where the value of the honest labour of creative minority is ignored.  
 
8. The power elite response 
As many democratic observers and organizers of the above protest 
meetings stated, in order to extinguish a protest wave the power elite usual-
ly employed three successful tactics. The first was deception and secrecy. 
The authorities promised the concerned public to investigate the case, to set 
up special commissions (a parliamentary commission of inquiry, in particu-
lar), they invited politically engaged experts, worked in full secrecy and 
many months later said that the protestors had been wrong and they, ie the 
authorities, were right, acting in strict accordance with law. The second tac-
tics aimed at breaking the unity of leading protest forces into numerous 
competing groups. The publicity (glasnost) of all actions of the too adver-
sarial sides could be the only remedy against such tactics (Parchomenko, 
2011). Last but not least was the setting up of the All-Russian popular front 
and formation from it of a mix of counter-movements, rallies and meetings 
in support of the existing political system. 
Theoretically, the authorities could use several strategies to meet the 
protestors’ challenges. First, they could try to guide the process of social 
renovation themselves. But for this they had to leave the cocoon and stop 
shying away from their fellow citizens. Another variant: to get away by 
chucking a few important but not key figures. Plus to mobilize Russian prov-
inces by spreading a myth that the protestors are rich, uppish and fed-up 
people. A more advantageous variant might be leadership of movement to-
ward modernization, but this necessitates a partner-like dialogue with the 
opponents, to which the government is not accustomed yet. Finally, the vari-
ant of ‘tightening the screws’ in the atmosphere of all-out corruption is 
viewed by experts as an unlikely one (Gorbachev and Samarina, 2011: 1, 3). 
What actually happened? At first, the government pretended that 
nothing had happened at all: there had been and would be protests, but the 
government strategy would remain the same notwithstanding. Taking the 
lead of the opposition movement was out of the question. One more princi-
